#### Internet Dial Tones & Firewalls: One Policy Does Not Fit All

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# **Information Access Trend**

- Online data is more accurate
- Stored/Staged data is obsolete
- Types of data
  - package tracking
  - technical data (private and public)
  - news and financial data
  - government filings
  - interwoven applications using XML


## Internet Access has become expected (cont'd)

- WiFi (wireless)
  - coffee shops (Starbucks)
  - bookstores (Borders)
  - airports
  - public spaces (NYC's Bryant Park)
  - conferences
  - 24x7x365 acccess, at will, wherever one is

#### However, inside enterprises –


- Outside, access is (or is becomming) ubiquitious
- Inside, access is increasing in complexity
- Past model was "gatehouse", hard outside inside was/is fairly soft
- One size fits all, no texture or subtlety

## **Traditional Simplistic Firewall Architecture**



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# Traditional Simplistic Firewall Architecture with DMZ



# **Internal Access Obligations/Restraints**

- Internal Security Pricing, Internal data
- National/Homeland Security
- Regulatory SEC, FDIC, FRB
- Legal HIPAA, other protected
- Less monolithic teams

# "Inside" Community is more Diverse

- Employees
- Contractors
- Vendors
- Salesman
- Customers
- Colleagues

## **Technology Concerns**

- both wired and WiFi have security concerns
- but, in a sense, the concerns/issues are the same


# **Security/Access Concerns**

- authentication
- privacy/anti-eavesdropping
- bandwidth allocation
- springboard elimination

## **Security Domains**

- Monolithic Domains cannot factor the problem space
- Sibling and Child Security Domains
- DMZs
- Cul-de-sacs
- pseudo-Public access to dial-tone
- HTTPS/X.509 Certificates within organization

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


# DMZs

- not just between Internet and intranet
- each organization contains many outsiders
- firewalls are internal security partitions

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# **Nested and Sibling Security Domains**



# Cul-de-sacs

- WAPs are only digital dial-tone
- getting out of a cul-de-sac requires VPN
- extensive use of proxy servers
- assumption of compromised network media

#### **Questions?**

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Session Notes & Materials: http://www.rlgsc.com/ieee/charleston/2003-6/index.html

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